Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements by Brandone, Amanda C. et al.
Cognitive Science 39 (2015) 711–738
Copyright © 2014 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN: 0364-0213 print / 1551-6709 online
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12176
Children’s Developing Intuitions About the Truth
Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus
Quantified Statements
Amanda C. Brandone,a Susan A. Gelman,b Jenna Hedglenb
aDepartment of Psychology, Lehigh University
bDepartment of Psychology, University of Michigan
Received 26 August 2011; received in revised form 5 February 2014; accepted 4 March 2014
Abstract
Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic pro-
file that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the devel-
opment of children’s intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from
statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) rec-
ognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of
prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implica-
tions. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of
generics and quantified statements; however, even 7- to 11-year-olds are not adultlike in their intu-
itions about the meaning of most-quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by pre-
school, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the
semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.
Keywords: Cognitive development; Concepts; Generic language; Language understanding;
Language acquisition; Semantics
1. Introduction
Statements such as ducks lay eggs, grass is green, and knives are dangerous, known as
generics, express generalizations about the members of a kind (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carl-
son & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). These statements are commonplace in everyday con-
versation and convey much of what we know about categories in the world. Generics are
intriguing to linguists (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995), philosophers (e.g.,
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Leslie, 2008), and psychologists (e.g., Gelman, 2004; Prasada, 2000) alike because they
present a series of puzzles, including how to explain their semantics and the relation
between their truth conditions and their implications. In this paper, we take a develop-
mental approach to these puzzles. Specifically, we explore the development of children’s
intuitions about the truth conditions and implications of generics, the relation between
them, and how children’s intuitions about generics differ from their intuitions about state-
ments using explicit quantifiers (e.g., all, most, and some).
1.1. The semantics of generics
The question of how to characterize the semantics of generics presents a sizable chal-
lenge. Generics can express predicates that are believed to be true for the majority (e.g.,
birds fly), half (e.g., lions have manes), or even fewer than half (e.g., mosquitoes carry
the West Nile Virus) of category members. Still other generics can be rejected even
though they are true of many (e.g., lions are male) or even the majority of category
instances (e.g., people are right-handed). This complex, often conflicting relation between
the truth of a generic statement and the statistical prevalence of the property in question
has received considerable attention in the linguistic and philosophical literatures and has
led to many attempts to explain the semantics of generics (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson &
Pelletier, 1995; Cohen, 1996; Diesing, 1992; Greenberg, 2003; Heim, 1982; Leslie, 2007;
Liebesman, 2011; Pelletier & Asher, 1997).
Recent work in psychology has offered a compelling theoretical framework to explain
this puzzling set of truth conditions (Gelman, 2010; Leslie, 2008, 2012; Prasada, 2000).
According to this view, generics articulate core conceptual beliefs about kinds. Debates
exist over whether the kind-based generalizations that generics express are quantitative
and statistical (e.g., Rosch, 1973) or more complex and theory driven (e.g., Gelman,
2003; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009). Nevertheless, an explanation of how we repre-
sent kinds must consider more than just quantitative, statistical information about the fea-
tures that co-occur with category membership; it must also consider the causal knowledge
that people have about categories. Thus, the truth of a generic can be understood as a
function of both quantitative information about the prevalence of the predicated property
within the kind (see Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009) and other causal and conceptual
knowledge linking the property to the kind (e.g., whether the property is innate, acquired,
or emerges over development; Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010; Gelman & Bloom,
2007; whether the property is particularly dangerous or distinctive; Cimpian, Brandone,
& Gelman, 2010; Leslie, 2007, 2008).
Another perplexing aspect of the semantics of generics is the relation between their
truth conditions and their prevalence implications. Cimpian, Brandone, et al. (2010) pro-
pose that there is an asymmetry at the core of generic meaning: Although the truth of a
generic may be unrelated to the prevalence of the predicated property, this is not the case
for the implications of generics. Generic statements have powerful prevalence implica-
tions. Imagine hearing the generic “parrots carry psittacosis.” Based on this statement, a
reasonable assumption is that psittacosis is widespread among parrots and that all or at
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least a majority are carriers of this disease. Research confirms that adults indeed expect
generics to apply to the vast majority of category members (Cimpian, Brandone, et al.,
2010; Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). Consistent with the proposal that generics have
strong implications yet require little evidence to be judged true, Cimpian, Brandone, et al.
(2010) found that adults interpreted novel generics (e.g., Lorches have purple feathers) as
referring to nearly all members of a kind (roughly 95%), yet judged the same generics to
be true at a wide range of prevalence levels (even as low as 10%).
This discrepancy between the truth conditions and implications of generics is not just
an intriguing linguistic phenomenon. This asymmetry also shows up in and can shape
real-world thinking. Consider a stereotype such as “Boys are good at sports.” The flexible
truth conditions of generics allow that a generalization such as this can be legitimized
based on very little evidence. Once accepted, however, this generalization can imply a far
more prevalent—even normative—fact with potential consequences for beliefs and behav-
ior (e.g., Abelson & Kanouse, 1966; Cimpian, Brandone, et al., 2010; Cimpian, Gelman,
et al., 2010; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012).
Importantly, the semantic idiosyncrasies described here are unique to generics. Quanti-
fied statements, in comparison, are relatively straightforward in their semantic interpreta-
tions.1 Quantifiers are used to express a more or less fixed prevalence (Carlson, 1977).
For example, all statements refer to an entire category without exception; some state-
ments are true as long as the property is present in at least a subset of category members;
finally, most statements are true when >50% of category members display the property.
(Here, we define the quantifiers some and most in terms of their lower bound—that is,
the minimum prevalence required for them to be considered true. When used in conversa-
tion, these quantifiers are often assumed to have an upper bound as well. For example, a
most statement [e.g., Most people are right-handed] conveys that [to the speaker’s knowl-
edge] the predicate applies to no more than most [i.e., not all] category members. In
cases such as these, known as scalar implicatures, the semantic and pragmatic aspects of
meaning differ [see Grice, 1989; Horn, 1992; Noveck, 2001]. For the present purposes,
however, we focus on the purely semantic interpretation of these quantifiers.)
Quantified statements are also relatively straightforward as compared to generics in
that they do not show the asymmetry between prevalence implications and truth condi-
tions observed for generics. Instead, they imply a prevalence that roughly matches that
required to judge them true. For example, all statements imply that a property is shared
by 100% of category members and requires a prevalence of 100% to be deemed true.
This claim has been validated for the quantifier most: Cimpian, Brandone, et al. (2010)
found that the prevalence that led adult participants to accept most-quantified statements
(e.g., Most lorches have purple feathers) was statistically identical to the prevalence
implied by them (roughly 80%).
Thus, overall, the literature suggests that generics present a complex and unique
semantic profile that is distinct from that of quantified statements and has important
implications for real-world thinking. Of particular interest in the present paper is the
question of how these semantic intuitions emerge during development.
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1.2. The semantics of generics for young children
Existing research suggests that, despite the puzzles generics present to scholars, they
are well within children’s grasp from early in development. Generics are frequent in the
speech young children hear in natural conversation and they occur in children’s own
spontaneous speech by 2½ years of age (e.g., Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, &
Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008; Pappas & Gelman, 1998; see
Sneed, 2008, for a linguistic account of the acquisition of genericity). Preschoolers com-
prehend generics and are able to distinguish them from non-generics on the basis of lexi-
cal, morphosyntactic, and contextual cues (e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman &
Raman, 2003; Graham, Nayer, & Gelman, 2011). Moreover, preschoolers can use the dis-
tinction between generics and non-generics to guide the inferences they draw when
acquiring new knowledge (e.g., Chambers, Graham, & Turner, 2008; Cimpian & Mark-
man, 2009, 2011; Gelman & Bloom, 2007; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Graham
et al., 2011; Hollander, Gelman, & Raman, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2012).
In contrast to the ease with which they acquire generics, quantified statements are rela-
tively difficult for children to master. In recent years, children’s comprehension of sen-
tences containing quantified expressions has received considerable attention (e.g., Brooks
& Braine, 1996; Crain et al., 1996; Gualmini, 2004; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Lidz &
Musolino, 2002; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). Data suggest that,
although even preschoolers appear to understand the semantic implications of some and
all on simplified tasks (Barner, Chow, & Yang, 2009; Smith, 1979, 1980), children con-
sistently make errors in interpreting the subtle aspects of the meaning of all (e.g., Brooks
& Sekerina, 2006), some (e.g., Guasti et al., 2005; Hurewitz, Papafragou, Gleitman, &
Gelman, 2006; Noveck, 2001), and most (Barner et al., 2009; Papafragou & Schwarz,
2006) until well into middle childhood. Controversy exists over the specific nature of
children’s difficulty and the extent to which it is semantic or pragmatic (e.g., Crain et al.,
1996; Musolino & Lidz, 2006; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Phillip, 1995; Pouscoulous,
Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007; Sullivan & Barner, 2011). Nevertheless, children often
differ from adults in the way they interpret sentences containing quantified expressions.
Intriguingly, when children’s understanding of generics and quantifiers has been exam-
ined in the same study, not only do quantified statements prove more challenging, they
also appear to be misinterpreted at first as if they were generic. Hollander, Gelman, and
Star (2002) found that when asked to evaluate the truth of generics and statements quanti-
fied by all or some (e.g., Are flowers/all flowers/some flowers yellow?), 4-year-olds and
adults appropriately differentiated their responses to generics versus quantified statements.
However, 3-year-olds gave the same pattern of responses regardless of whether they were
given quantified statements or generics, and these responses were indistinguishable from
the responses older children and adults gave in response to generics. To account for these
findings, Leslie (2008, 2012) has proposed that generics express cognitively fundamental,
default generalizations that are easier, more automatic, and appear developmentally
earlier than other forms of generalization. In contrast, quantified statements express
generalizations that are more cognitively complex and effortful, and thus appear later and
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prove more difficult for children to master (see Leslie & Gelman, 2012 for further
evidence).
Although the existing literature and the generics-as-default proposal suggest that chil-
dren master generics early in development, questions remain regarding the extent to
which children share adults’ intuitions about the unique semantic profile of generics. In
the current paper, we were interested in examining the development of children’s intu-
itions about the semantics of generics by systematically testing: (a) how children evaluate
the truth conditions and prevalence implications of generics; (b) the relation between
them; and (c) how children’s intuitions about generics differ from their intuitions about
statements quantified by all, most, and some.
Consider first the question of how children evaluate the truth conditions and prevalence
implications of generics. Studies have shown that, like adults, preschoolers recognize that
generics can be true despite salient exceptions (Gelman & Raman, 2003), understand that
the truth of a generic depends on more than just the statistical prevalence of the predi-
cated property (Brandone, Cimpian, Leslie, & Gelman, 2012), and interpret generics as
broad in scope but tolerant of exceptions (Gelman et al., 2002). However, more research
is needed to systematically test children’s intuitions about the precise truth conditions and
implied prevalence of generics. In particular, we know that adults judge generics to be
true at a wide range of prevalence levels (roughly 65% on average, but even as low as
10%; Cimpian, Brandone, et al., 2010); however, it remains an open question whether
young children also understand that generics can represent a broad range of prevalence
levels. Moreover, we know that adults estimate the prevalence of a novel generic to apply
to roughly 95% of category members (Cimpian, Brandone, et al., 2010); yet it remains an
open question what prevalence level children assume given a novel generic.
Our second research question examines the relation between children’s intuitions about
the truth conditions and implications of generics. Research with adults has shown that an
important asymmetry exists such that adults interpret novel generics as referring to the
vast majority of category members, but they judge the same novel generics to be true
given a wide range of prevalence levels—even 10% or 30% (Cimpian, Brandone, et al.,
2010). Here, we provide the first test of whether this asymmetry also exists in children.
Note that these questions are not just interesting from a linguistic perspective; they
also have important implications for understanding children’s conceptual development.
Since generic concepts are central to human reasoning and provide insight into the nature
of concepts (e.g., Prasada, 2000), determining how children interpret the truth conditions
of generics can shed light on the nature of children’s early kind concepts. Moreover,
because generic testimony from others serves as an important source of knowledge for
young children (e.g., Gelman, 2009; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2012), estab-
lishing what children see as the implications of generics can help us to understand the
process by which children incorporate new information conveyed through generic lan-
guage into their world knowledge.
Our final research question tests the uniqueness of the semantic profile of generics by
asking whether children, like adults, differentiate the semantics of generics from those
of statements quantified by all, most, and some. Studies have shown that children can
A. C. Brandone, S. A. Gelman, J. Hedglen / Cognitive Science 39 (2015) 715
distinguish the truth conditions of generics from all or some statements (Hollander et al.,
2002) and that children show different patterns of inferences after hearing information
about a familiar category presented in generic, all, and some form (Gelman et al., 2002).
Yet data also suggest that children have difficulty mastering the semantics of quantified
statements (e.g., Brooks & Sekerina, 2006; Hurewitz et al., 2006; Papafragou & Schwarz,
2006) and in some cases interpret some and all statements as though they were generic
(Hollander et al., 2002). Finally, no studies have examined whether children differentiate
the semantics of generics from statements quantified by most—the quantifier argued to
come closest to capturing generic meaning (Carlson, 1977). Thus, further research is
needed to systematically address the extent to which children differentiate the truth condi-
tions and implications of generics and statements quantified by all, some, and most.
1.3. The present studies
Two experiments were conducted to systematically examine children’s intuitions about
the semantics of generics and quantified statements referring to novel categories. Novel
categories about which children had no prior knowledge were used to present a pure test
of children’s semantic intuitions. To provide a thorough developmental account, each
study included a sample of preschoolers (aged 4 and 5 years), older children (aged 7–11
years), and adults. In Study 1, we explored the truth conditions of generics and quantifi-
ers. Specifically, we used a sentence verification task with novel animal categories to ask
(a) whether children understand that generics are capable of representing a broad range of
prevalence levels and (b) how children’s intuitions about the truth conditions of generics
differ from their intuitions about statements quantified by all, most, and some. In Study 2,
we explored the implied prevalence of generics and quantifiers. We asked (a) what preva-
lence level children assume upon hearing a generic about a novel category, and (b)
whether children recognize the implications of generics as distinct from those of state-
ments quantified by all, most, and some. Finally, to determine whether the asymmetry in
generic meaning shown previously in adults (Cimpian, Brandone, et al., 2010) extends to
children, we compared responses across Study 1 and Study 2.
Consistent with evidence supporting young children’s skill in using and comprehending
generics (e.g., Brandone et al., 2012; Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman et al., 2008;
Hollander et al., 2002) and theoretical claims that generics reflect default generalizations
(Leslie, 2008, 2012), we predicted that both preschoolers and older children would dem-
onstrate adultlike intuitions about the semantics of generic statements. Specifically, we
predicted that preschoolers and older children would accept generics at a broad range of
prevalence levels in Study 1 and assume widespread prevalence implications in Study 2.
We also predicted that the asymmetry in generic meaning demonstrated in adults (Cim-
pian, Brandone, et al., 2010) would be observed in children.
Regarding children’s comprehension of explicit quantifiers and their differentiation
from generics, we made the following predictions. First, consistent with studies docu-
menting children’s errors in interpreting quantified statements into middle childhood (e.g.,
Brooks & Sekerina, 2006; Hurewitz et al., 2006; Papafragou & Schwarz, 2006) and the
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theoretical claim that quantified statements communicate cognitively sophisticated gener-
alizations (Leslie, 2008, 2012), we predicted that performance in response to quantified
statements would be less adultlike than performance in response to generic statements
and would become more adultlike with age. Second, in line with the generics-as-default
hypothesis (Leslie, 2008, 2012) and initial findings from Hollander et al. (2002) that
3-year-olds interpreted all and some statements about familiar categories as if they were
generics, we predicted that preschoolers may treat quantified statements about novel
categories in the current studies though they were generic.
2. Study 1: Truth conditions of generics
In Study 1, we examined the truth conditions of generics and quantifiers using a sen-
tence verification task with completely novel animal categories. We asked (a) whether
children understand that generics are capable of representing a broad range of prevalence
levels and (b) how children’s intuitions about the truth conditions of generics differ from
their intuitions about the truth conditions of quantified statements (e.g., some, most, and
all).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Sixteen adults (3 males, 13 females), 16 older children (7.08–10.62 years; M =
8.56 years; 6 males, 10 females), and 24 preschoolers (4.11–5.73 years; M = 4.66 years;
12 males, 12 females) participated. Two additional preschoolers were tested and excluded
from the final sample due to failure to comprehend the practice items. Preschoolers
were recruited from in and around a Midwestern U.S. university town. Older children
were recruited from a midsize city in the Northeastern U.S. Children were predomi-
nantly middle class and white. Adults were undergraduate students in an Introduction
to Psychology class at a large Midwestern university and participated for course credit.
2.1.2. Materials
Materials included 32 novel animal kinds each with a distinctive physical feature.
There were four types of features: pattern (e.g., spots), color (e.g., red), part (e.g., wings),
and part color (e.g., orange ears). Feature types were distributed over the 32 kinds such
that eight kinds displayed each of the four feature types. For each kind, images depicting
a sample of six individuals were created. The number of individuals displaying the
distinctive feature within each sample varied at the follow prevalence levels: 0 (0%),
2 (33%), 4 (67%), and 6 (100%) out of 6 (see Fig. 1). These prevalence levels were
selected to provide a range from 0% to 100% and to include both a minority and a major-
ity sample. Which prevalence level was presented for each item was counterbalanced
across participants. Each participant saw just one sample of each animal kind.
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2.1.3. Procedure
Children were tested individually with an experimenter in a quiet room. Adults were
tested in groups in a written version of the task. For each item, participants saw one sam-
ple of an animal kind and were asked to indicate whether a corresponding statement
(e.g., Crullets have spots) is right or wrong. Adults responded by circling their answer
choice. Children responded by pointing to a picture of a happy (for right responses) or
sad (for wrong responses) face. To motivate the task, children were introduced to a pup-
pet named Droid, described as an alien from outer space who is trying to teach children
about the animals on his planet. Children were told that Droid gets confused, so some-
times he says things that are wrong. Children were asked to help Droid by telling him
whether each of his statements is right or wrong.
2.1.3.1. Practice trials: To convey that Droid’s statements could be either right or
wrong, participants were first given a practice task consisting of four items—two
designed to elicit right responses (e.g., a picture of bananas with the statement “This is a
picture of bananas”) and two designed to elicit wrong responses (e.g., a picture of a white
house with the statement “This house is blue”). Children were corrected in the practice
Fig. 1. Sample animal kind (“crullets”) showing target feature (“spots”) at each of four prevalence levels
(0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%).
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task if they responded incorrectly. Two children who responded incorrectly on two or
more trials were excluded from the final sample.
2.1.3.2. Primary task: Following the practice items, the primary task began. For each
item, participants saw a single sample of an animal kind displaying a target feature at
one of four prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%). Participants were asked to
indicate whether a corresponding statement was right or wrong. Statements were in one
of the following wording conditions: generic (e.g., Ackles have spikes), some (e.g., Some
taifels have pink feathers), most (e.g., Most ollers are green), or all (e.g., All noobs have
hair). Animal names were always presented in the subject position. All generics used the
bare plural form. Wording conditions (generic, some, most, and all) were presented in
blocks of eight items. Each block included two items at each prevalence level and two
items from each feature category (e.g., pattern, color, part, and part color). Block order
was counterbalanced using a Latin Square design.
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Do children recognize that generics represent a broad range of prevalence levels?
The first set of analyses examined the central question of whether children, like adults,
understand that generics are capable of representing a broad range of prevalence levels.
We performed a mixed 3 (age group: preschoolers, older children, adults; between) 9
4 (wording order; between) 9 4 (prevalence level: 0%, 33%, 67%, 100%; within) ANOVA
on the proportion of right selections in response to generic statements. Results revealed a
significant main effect of prevalence level, F(3, 132) = 71.67, p < .001, g2p = .62, and no
significant effects or interactions with age. As shown in Fig. 2, according to linear trend
analyses, preschoolers, F(1, 20) = 146.18, p < .001, g2p = .88, older children, F(1,
12) = 112.34, p < .001, g2p = .90, and adults, F(1, 12) = 1,152.00, p < .001, g
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Fig. 2. Mean proportion of “right” responses to generic statements on the truth condition task (Study 1) by
age group.
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all showed a linear effect of prevalence level such that the average proportion of right
responses increased as the prevalence level increased.
Notably, generics were periodically judged to be true even when the prevalence of the
property was quite low: 12 of 24 preschoolers, 5 of 16 older children, and 5 of 16 adults
responded that a generic was true when the property in question was present in only 33%
of category members. Participants offered right responses at this prevalence level an aver-
age of 34.8% of the time (43.8%, 25.0%, and 31.3% for preschoolers, older children, and
adults, respectively). Analyses using the generalized estimating equations (GEEs) proce-
dure (Liang & Zeger, 1986) revealed that, overall, the likelihood of judging a generic
statement as right in response to the 33% prevalence level was significantly greater than
the likelihood of doing so in response to the 0% prevalence level, v2(1) = 26.86,
p < .001. This comparison was significant for adults and preschoolers (ps < .05) and
marginal for children in the older age group (p = .060). Together, these results confirm
that both children and adults are sometimes willing to judge novel generic statements as
true on the basis of little evidence.
2.2.2. Do children differentiate the truth conditions of generics and quantified
statements?
Our next set of analyses asked whether children’s intuitions about the truth conditions
of generics differ from those of statements quantified by some, most, or all. To address
this question, we first examined the average prevalence level that led to right responses
for each statement type.2 For example, if a subject selected right in response to generics
whenever the prevalence was 67% or 100% and wrong for anything else, then that per-
son’s average prevalence that led to right responses for generics would be 83.3%—the
mean of 67% and 100%. These data were entered into a 3 (age group: preschoolers, older
children, adults; between) 9 4 (wording order; between) 9 4 (wording: generic, all,
most, some; within) ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of wording, F(3, 132) = 65.55,
p < .001, g2p = .60, and an interaction of wording 9 age group, F(6, 132) = 2.78, p =
.014, g2p = .11. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that the average
prevalence level that led to right responses for all wording conditions differed signifi-
cantly from each other (ps < .001; MAll = 94.95%, MMost = 74.82%, MSome = 62.28%,
MGeneric = 81.85%). Separate ANOVAS analyzing the effect of wording within each age
group revealed a similar pattern of results for children and adults. The average prevalence
level that led to right responses for each wording condition at each age group is
displayed in Table 1.
To explore the perceived truth conditions of generics versus quantified statements in a
more nuanced way, we next examined the proportion of right responses participants pro-
vided at each prevalence level. We performed a mixed 3 (age group: preschoolers, older
children, adults; between) 9 4 (wording order; between) 9 4 (wording: generic, all,
most, some; within) 9 4 (prevalence level: 0%, 33%, 67%, 100%; within) ANOVA. Results
showed significant main effects of wording, F(3, 129) = 31.45, p < .001, g2p = .42, and
prevalence level, F(3, 129) = 146.39, p < .001, g2p = .77, as well as significant interactions
of wording 9 age group, F(6, 129) = 2.47, p = .027, g2p = .10; wording 9 prevalence
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level, F(9, 387) = 30.82, p < .001, g2p = .42; and wording 9 prevalence level 9 age
group, F(18, 387) = 2.67, p < .001, g2p = .11.
To disentangle the three-way interaction, we first examined the effects of prevalence
level and age group within each wording condition (see Fig. 3). Here, we asked whether
for each wording condition, preschoolers, older children, and adults responded differently
to samples of varying prevalence levels. Results revealed a significant prevalence
level 9 age group interaction in some wording conditions, but not others. In particular,
the interaction was significant in both the most, F(6, 129) = 2.18, p = .049, g2p = .092
and some conditions, F(6, 132) = 2.73, p = .016, g2p = .11, suggesting that children and
adults differ from one another in their intuitions about the prevalence required for most
and some statements to be considered true. In contrast, in the generic and all conditions
this interaction was non-significant (ps > .24), indicating that children and adults share
the same intuitions about the prevalence required for generic and all statements to be
considered true. These data suggest that children show adultlike reasoning about the truth
conditions of generics and all statements; however, their reasoning about most and some
statements is still maturing. In particular, for some statements, older children performed
equivalently to adults, whereas preschoolers did not, F(3, 96) = 2.73, p = .048,
g2p = .079. In contrast, for most statements, children of both age groups performed differ-
ently from adults—significantly so for the younger age group, F(3, 93) = 3.91, p = .011,
g2p = .11, and marginally so for the older age group, F(3, 69) = 2.33, p = .082,
g2p = .092.
To further explore how participants in each age group differentiated the truth condi-
tions of the generic and quantified statements, we next examined the effects of prevalence
level and wording condition separately for each age group. Here, we asked whether
Table 1
Mean prevalence level (SD) that led to “right” responses on the truth condition task (Study 1) and mean
prevalence (SD) on the implied prevalence task (Study 2) by age group and wording
Age Group Wording
Mean Prevalence Level (SD)
Significant Task Effect
Truth Condition
Task (Study 1)
Implied Prevalence Task
(Study 2)
Adults Generic 87.5 (15.5) 99.0 (4.2) *
All 99.3 (2.8) 100.0 (0.0)
Most 74.0 (15.8) 67.2 (2.1)
Some 58.2 (13.9) 42.7 (13.9) *
Older Children Generic 81.1 (15.0) 97.8 (8.6) *
All 95.0 (11.1) 100.0 (0.0)
Most 73.0 (14.8) 91.1 (15.3) *
Some 62.0 (16.6) 53.9 (16.6)
Preschoolers Generic 76.7 (15.7) 87.5 (16.5) *
All 90.1 (14.1) 95.5 (9.8)
Most 77.1 (15.6) 84.0 (16.8)
Some 66.3 (17.8) 66.3 (22.7)
Note. *Indicates p < .05 for task comparison within each wording condition and age group.
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Fig. 3. Mean proportion of “right” responses on the truth condition task (Study 1) by wording, prevalence
level, and age group: (A) adults, (B) older children, (C) preschoolers.
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adults, older children, and preschoolers responded to the prevalence levels differently for
each statement type.
As can be seen in Fig. 3A, adults showed a different pattern of responses for each
wording condition (ps < .01). Adults viewed all statements as correct only when 100% of
category members displayed the key feature; they judged most statements as correct at
prevalence levels of 67% or greater; and they judged some statements as correct at preva-
lence levels as low as 33%. Adults also showed evidence of scalar implicatures in the
most and some conditions; that is, they showed an increased tendency to reject most and
some statements when they were used to describe the 100% samples. Finally, as men-
tioned previously, for generics adults showed a linear effect of prevalence level such that
they were more likely to accept generics as right as the prevalence of the property
increased (linear trend analysis). Adults did not show evidence of scalar implicatures for
generics. Overall, these data show that adults perceive generic, all, most, and some state-
ments as each having their own unique set of truth-values.3
As can be seen in Fig. 3B, the pattern of results for the older children was similar to
that of adults with a few key exceptions. Like adults, older children viewed all statements
as correct only when 100% of category members displayed the key feature. Also like
adults, older children accepted some statements at prevalence levels as low as 33% and
showed evidence of scalar implicatures in their tendency to reject some-quantified state-
ments at the 100% level. Unlike adults, however, for older children, the effect of preva-
lence level did not differ between most statements and generics, F(3, 36) = 1.51, p = .23,
g2p = .11. Linear trend analyses showed that a linear effect of prevalence level emerged
in older children’s responses to both generics and most statements. Thus, older children
differentiated each wording condition (all ps < .01) except most and generic.
Finally, the youngest age group showed a distinct pattern of results. As can be seen in
Fig. 3C, the effect of prevalence level in the all wording condition was different from
that in the most, some, and generic wording conditions (all ps < .001). Like adults and
older children, preschoolers viewed all-quantified statements as correct mainly at the
100% prevalence level. Preschoolers’ pattern of responses for the other wording condi-
tions, however, was less differentiated: The effect of prevalence level was only margin-
ally different in the comparison between most and some, F(3, 69) = 2.24, p = .092,
g2p = .089, with preschoolers accepting some statements marginally more often than most
statements at the 33% level. This effect was also marginally different in the comparison
between some statements and generics, F(3, 69) = 2.18, p = .098, g2p = .087, with pre-
schoolers accepting some statements marginally more often than generics at the 33% level.
Finally, similar to older children, but unlike adults, there was no difference in the effect of
prevalence level on preschoolers’ reasoning about most statements and generics,
F(3, 69) = .21, p = .89, g2p = .009. A linear effect of prevalence level emerged in
preschoolers’ responses to both generics and most statements (linear trend analysis). Note
that preschoolers also did not show any sensitivity to scalar implicatures. Preschoolers were
somewhat more (rather than less) likely to accept some- and most-quantified statements
when they were used to describe 100% samples. These data suggest that by 4–5 years,
children are beginning to differentiate the truth conditions of generics and quantifiers;
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however, their reasoning about most and some statements is still maturing and they do not
appear to clearly distinguish the semantics of generic, most, and some statements.
2.2.3. Conclusions
Overall, the results of Study 1 support two main conclusions. First, by 4–5 years of
age, children understand that generics are capable of representing a broad range of preva-
lence levels. Preschoolers and older children in the current study were willing to accept
novel generics that were true of only a minority of category members (at the lowest non-
zero prevalence level tested—33%). Crucially, because these studies used novel catego-
ries about which children had no prior knowledge, they provide a pure test of children’s
understanding of the role that prevalence plays in generic meaning. Second, our data
demonstrate that children are in the process of differentiating the truth conditions of
generics and quantified statements throughout childhood. Children are sensitive to the dif-
ference between generics and all statements by preschool. By middle childhood (and to a
much lesser extent during preschool), children are also sensitive to the difference between
generics and some statements. However, preschoolers and older children do not appear to
distinguish the truth conditions of generics and most statements. Although these conclu-
sions are necessarily limited by the sensitivity of our methodology, they are consistent
with the hypothesis that generics may be a kind of default (Hollander et al., 2002; Leslie,
2008, 2012). In support of this proposal, most-quantified statements were interpreted
equivalently to generics by preschoolers and older children; some-quantified statements
also showed a tendency to be interpreted as generic by preschoolers. Together these
results suggest that children share adults’ intuitions about the flexible truth conditions of
generics from an early age and continue to learn how the truth conditions of quantified
statements are different from generics throughout childhood.
3. Study 2: Prevalence implications of generics
In Study 2, we further explored the development of intuitions about the meaning of
generics by examining the implied prevalence of generics and quantified statements. We
asked (a) what prevalence level children assume upon hearing a generic about a novel
category, and (b) whether children recognize the implications of generics as distinct from
those of statements quantified by all, most, and some. Crucially, to determine whether the
asymmetry in generic meaning shown previously in adults (Cimpian, Brandone, et al.,
2010) extends to children, we also compared participants’ responses across Study 1 and
Study 2.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Sixteen adults (7 males, 9 females), 15 older children (7.04–11.25 years; M =
8.31 years; 7 males, 8 females), and 24 preschoolers (4.16–5.32 years; M = 4.64 years; 9
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males, 15 females) participated. Participants were recruited as in Study 1. Five additional
children were tested and excluded from the final sample for failing two or more practice
items.
3.1.2. Materials
Materials were identical to those in Study 1.
3.1.3. Procedure
Children were tested individually with an experimenter. Adults were tested in groups
with a written version of the task. For each item, participants were asked to indicate
which of four samples best represents a corresponding statement (e.g., Which of these
pictures best shows that crullets have spots?). Options included samples at each of the
four prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%). Materials were presented in pre-
printed booklets with all four samples on a single page (see Fig. 1). Adults responded by
circling the sample they believed best represented each statement. Children responded by
putting a sticker on the appropriate sample. To motivate the task, children were intro-
duced to a puppet named Droid. Droid was described as an alien from outer space who is
making a picture book to teach children about the different kinds of animals on his pla-
net. Children were asked to help Droid decide which pictures to put in his book.
3.1.4. Practice trials
To convey that on a given item participants needed to select one of the four samples,
participants completed two practice tasks. The first involved selecting the picture that
matched the experimenter’s question from a set of four pictures. In this task, there were
two items: One required finding the picture of bananas from a set of four foods; the other
required finding the picture of a blue house from a set of four houses. The second task
involved selecting a picture based on a precise quantification term. Participants were
shown four samples of the same animal kind at varying prevalence levels and were asked
to select the sample in which a specified number of animals displayed the target property
(e.g., Which of these pictures best shows that two daxes have ears?) This task included
four items—one targeting each prevalence level. Children were corrected if they
responded incorrectly. Five participants who responded incorrectly on two or more prac-
tice items were excluded from the final sample.
3.1.4.1. Primary task: For a given item, participants saw four samples from the same
animal kind. The prevalence of the distinctive feature within each sample varied with one
sample at each of the four prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%). The order in
which the samples appeared on the page was systematically varied. Participants were
asked to indicate which of the four samples best represents the given information. In the
generic condition, participants were asked questions in generic form (e.g., What’s the best
picture to show that ackles have spikes?). In the some, most, and all conditions, partici-
pants were asked questions quantified by some, most, and all, respectively (e.g., What’s
the best picture to show that some/most/all ackles have spikes?). As in Study 1, animal
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names were always presented in the subject position and all generics used the bare plural
form. Wording conditions (generic, some, most, and all) were presented in blocks. Each
block consisted of four items. Block order was counterbalanced using a Latin Square
design. For a given participant, all four-item sets within each block came from the same
feature category (e.g., pattern, color, part, and part color). The order in which these fea-
ture categories were presented and the wording condition to which they were assigned
were counterbalanced such that feature categories were presented in each of the four
block positions and with each of the four wording conditions an equal number of times.
3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. What is the implied prevalence of generics and quantifiers for children?
The goal of Study 2 was to determine what prevalence level children assume upon
hearing a novel generic and whether children recognize the implied prevalence of gener-
ics as distinct from those of quantified statements. To address these questions, we
performed a mixed 3 (age group: preschoolers, older children, adults; between) 9 4
(wording order; between) 9 4 (wording: generic, all, most, some; within) ANOVA on the
average prevalence level participants selected. Results revealed main effects of wording,
F(3, 129) = 116.27, p < .001, g2p = .73, and age group, F(2, 43) = 4.34, p = .019,
g2p = .17, that are best interpreted in light of a wording 9 age group interaction, F(2,
129) = 14.15, p < .001, g2p = .40.
As can be seen in Table 1, the prevalence levels adults selected for the quantified
statements differed significantly from each other (Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise compari-
sons; ps < .001). As expected, the implied prevalence of all was greater than most, which
was greater than some. Adults tended to select the 100% sample for all, the 67% sample
for most, and the 33% sample for some at levels significantly greater than chance (.25)
(ps < .001; see Table 2 for the average proportion of selections at each prevalence level).
Crucially, adults also differentiated the implied prevalence of generics and statements
quantified by some and most (ps < .001): They assumed the prevalence of a novel generic
to be greater than that of a some- or most-quantified statement. However, adults did not
differentiate the implied prevalence of generics and all statements. When evaluating
which picture best illustrates a generic property, adults selected the 100% prevalence
level the vast majority of the time (see Table 2).
The pattern of responses for preschoolers was comparable, but different in several key
ways. As can be seen in Table 1, the youngest children also differentiated the implied
prevalence of the quantifiers (Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons; all ps < .003).
Like adults, they judged the implied prevalence of all to be greater than most, which was
greater than some. However, their responses differed significantly from those of adults in
each wording condition except all (ps < .002), and preschoolers’ responses were more
varied than those of adults. Preschoolers selected the 100% sample the vast majority of
the time for all-quantified statements. But they selected both the 67% and 100% samples
in response to most-quantified statements, and they selected the 33%, 67%, and 100%
samples at chance levels in response to some-quantified statements (see Table 2)—sug-
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gesting a lack of sensitivity to the scalar implicatures in statements quantified by most
and some.
With respect to the key comparison between the implications of generics and quanti-
fied statements (see Table 1), preschoolers differentiated the implied prevalence of gener-
ics and some statements (p = .002). In addition, they showed a marginal tendency toward
differentiating generics and statements quantified by all (p = .072). However, preschool-
ers did not differentiate the implications of generics and most-quantified statements
(p = .73). These data suggest that preschool age children are beginning to distinguish the
implications of generics and quantifiers; however, they appear not to discriminate the
meaning of generics and most-quantified statements.
Finally, the pattern of responses for the older children fell in between that of pre-
schoolers and adults. Older children responded statistically equivalently to adults in
response to all, some, and generic statements (all ps > .39; Table 1). However, in
response to most-quantified statements, older children provided unexpectedly high implied
prevalence responses that were not significantly different from their responses to all-quan-
tified statements. Older children selected the 100% sample at levels significantly greater
than chance for both the all- and most-quantified statements—suggesting a lack of sensi-
tivity to the scalar implicatures in statements quantified by most4 (and, to some extent, in
statements quantified by some; see Table 2).
With respect to the key comparison between the implications of generics and explicitly
quantified statements (see Table 1), older children differentiated the implied prevalence
of generics and statements quantified by some (p < .001). In addition, older children
performed like adults in that they did not differentiate the implied prevalence of generics
and statements quantified by all; however, older children also performed like preschool-
ers in that they did not differentiate the implied prevalence of generics and statements
Table 2
Mean proportion (SD) of times each prevalence level was selected in the implied prevalence task (Study 2)
by age group and wording
Age Group Wording
Prevalence Level
0% 33% 67% 100%
Adults Generic 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) 0.98 (0.06)*
All 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)*
Most 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.95 (0.14)* 0.02 (0.06)
Some 0.00 (0.00) 0.75 (0.39)* 0.22 (0.38) 0.03 (0.09)
Older children Generic 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.26) 0.93 (0.26)*
All 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)*
Most 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.27 (0.46) 0.73 (0.46)*
Some 0.00 (0.00) 0.42 (0.47) 0.55 (0.46)* 0.03 (0.09)
Preschoolers Generic 0.00 (0.00) 0.08 (0.16) 0.21 (0.31) 0.71 (0.38)*
All 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.08 (0.16) 0.90 (0.21)*
Most 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.13) 0.32 (0.34) 0.60 (0.40)*
Some 0.00 (0.00) 0.33 (0.37) 0.38 (0.38) 0.29 (0.39)
Note. *Indicates greater than chance (.25) performance, p < .05.
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quantified by most (ps > .55).5 Altogether, these data suggest that children in middle
childhood are adultlike in their reasoning about the semantic implications of generics;
however, they appear to still be fine-tuning their intuitions about the implications of state-
ments quantified by most.
3.2.2. Is there an asymmetry in generic meaning for young children?
The goal of the final set of analyses was to test for an asymmetry in generic meaning:
namely, that generic statements have strong implications yet require little evidence to be
judged true. As in Cimpian, Brandone, et al. (2010), we compared the average prevalence
level that led to right responses in the truth condition task (Study 1) with the average
prevalence level selected for each type of statement in the implied prevalence task (Study
2). To do so, we performed a 2 (task: truth condition vs. implied prevalence;
between) 9 3 (age group: preschoolers, older children, adults; between) 9 4 (wording:
generic, all, most, some; within) ANOVA. Here, we focus on effects and interactions involv-
ing the variable task (truth condition vs. implied prevalence). Results revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of task, F(1, 105) = 4.50, p = .036, g2p = .041, and a task 9 wording
interaction, F(1, 192) = 6.76, p < .001, g2p = .096 (see Table 1). The three-way interac-
tion of age group 9 task 9 wording was only marginally significant, F(6, 315) = 2.04,
p = .06, g2p = .037. However, because our goal was to test whether an asymmetry is pres-
ent in children’s judgments about generics, we evaluated the task 9 wording interaction
separately for each age group.
We used tests of simple effects to check for an effect of task for adults and children
within each wording condition. Of special interest was the generic condition. As can be
seen in Table 1, results confirmed the predicted asymmetry for preschoolers, F(1,
43) = 5.15, p = .028, g2p = .11, older children, F(1, 26) = 13.51, p = .001, g
2
p = .34, and
adults, F(1, 27) = 7.80, p = .009, g2p = .22. The average prevalence that led participants
to accept generics in the truth condition task (Study 1) was significantly lower than the
average prevalence implied by them in Study 2. For the youngest children, this asymme-
try was unique to reasoning about generics: the effect of task was non-significant for all-,
some-, and most-quantified statements (all ps > .14). For older children, this asymmetry
was also observed for most-quantified statements, F(1, 26) = 8.92, p = .001, g2p = .33,
confirming the older children’s lack of differentiation of generics and most statements.
Finally, for adults, this comparison was non-significant for all- and most-quantified state-
ments and the opposite effect was found for some-quantified statements: The prevalence
that led adults to accept some statements was greater than the prevalence implied by
them, F(1, 27) = 9.36, p = .005, g2p = .26.
3.3. Conclusions
Overall, the results of Study 2 and the comparison between the truth condition task
(Study 1) and the implied prevalence task (Study 2) support three main conclusions. First,
for both children and adults, generics have powerful prevalence implications. Upon hear-
ing a novel generic, adults and children as young as 4 years assume the property is true
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of the vast majority of category members. Second, between the ages of 4 and 11, children
are beginning to differentiate the implications of generics and quantified statements; how-
ever, even 7- to 11-year-old children do not appear to be adultlike in their intuitions
about the implications of some and most and how they differ from generics. Finally, our
results confirm the presence of an asymmetry in reasoning about generics that is present
as early as preschool. Both adults and young children assumed that generic statements
about novel categories apply to nearly all members of the relevant categories; however,
they often judged the same generic statements to be correct even when the prevalence of
the property was much lower.
With respect to this asymmetry, it is important to note that the tasks assessing the truth
conditions and implied prevalence of generics and quantified statements are not entirely
symmetrical. The truth conditions task required participants to evaluate a range of preva-
lence levels as right or wrong, while the implied prevalence task asked participants to
select just one (i.e., the best one). Because of this difference, the truth condition task may
be measuring the average prevalence level, whereas the implied prevalence task may be
measuring the modal prevalence level. If this is the case, it still means that generics are
distinctive in being used to refer to one set of prevalence levels (i.e., from 33% to 100%)
but being interpreted according to a different set of prevalence levels (i.e., at or close to
100%). In a sense, this phenomenon can be considered parallel to what occurs in a scalar
implicature. Although generics do not show scalar implicatures like some and most state-
ments, just as there is a distinction between what a some-quantified statement can mean
(i.e., any non-null set) and what it implies (i.e., not more than some), in the case of
generics there is a distinction between what the generic statement can mean (i.e., a wide
range of prevalence levels) and what it implies (i.e., near-universal prevalence levels).
Importantly, our data suggest that this asymmetry is present for generics as early as
4 years of age. We discuss the significance and implications of this phenomenon in the
General discussion.
4. General discussion
The goal of this research was to explore the development of semantic intuitions about
generics by investigating (a) how children evaluate the truth conditions and implications
of generics; (b) whether the asymmetry observed in adults’ reasoning about the truth con-
ditions and implications of generics is shared by children; and (c) whether children differ-
entiate the unique semantics of generics from those of statements quantified by all, most,
and some. Overall, our data reveal that young children share adults’ intuitions about the
meaning of generics. Specifically, we found that, like adults, preschoolers and older chil-
dren recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing
a wide range of prevalence levels (from 33% to 100%; Study 1). In addition, we found
that, like adults, preschoolers and older children interpret novel generics as having extre-
mely high prevalence implications (Study 2). These studies thus provide the first evidence
that for young children (like adults), generics embody a paradoxical combination of
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flexible truth conditions and near-universal prevalence implications. Finally, we found
that between the ages of 4 and 11, children are working to master the semantics of state-
ments quantified by all, some, and especially most, and to differentiate them from gener-
ics. We elaborate on each of these contributions in the sections below.
4.1. The semantics of generics
The current data extend and confirm previous research on the unique semantics of
generics. In particular, research with adults has established that there is a loose, often
negligible relation between the truth of a generic statement and the statistical prevalence
of the property to which it refers. One explanation for this phenomenon is that generics
reflect default ways of thinking about kinds (e.g., Leslie, 2008, 2012). On this view, the
truth values of generics are a function of not only the prevalence of the predicated prop-
erty but also other causal and conceptual knowledge that links that property to the kind
(Cimpian, Brandone, et al., 2010; Cimpian, Gelman, et al., 2010; Gelman & Bloom,
2007; Leslie, 2008; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009). Previous research has provided
some indication that children may appreciate this aspect of generic meaning—at least in
the context of familiar categories. For example, when presented with questions expressing
properties that were matched in prevalence but varied in whether or not adults accept
them as generically true (e.g., “Do lions have manes?” [True] vs. “Are lions boys?”
[False]), children were more likely to affirm generics that express properties that are char-
acteristic of familiar kinds than those that are statistically matched in prevalence yet not
characteristic of the kinds (Brandone et al., 2012). Data from Study 1 extend these results
in two key ways. First, our data establish that children can reason about the role of preva-
lence in generic meaning even in the context of completely novel categories about which
they have no prior knowledge. Second, our findings provide the first systematic evidence
that preschoolers are willing to endorse a generic that is true of only a minority of kind
members (at the lowest non-zero prevalence level tested—33%). Together, these results
demonstrate that by 4–5 years of age, children appreciate the nuanced relation between
the statistical prevalence of a property and the truth of a generic.
The findings from Study 2 also add to the literature on the implications of generics.
Although the question of what a novel generic implies to young children has been exam-
ined indirectly in previous research on the inductive inferences that generics license (e.g.,
Chambers et al., 2008; Gelman et al., 2002), the current research provides the first test of
the prevalence level children assume upon hearing a novel generic. Our data indicate that
novel generics imply near-universal scope to children—applying to roughly 87.5% and
97.8% of category members for preschoolers and older children, respectively.
It is interesting to note that this is an area where the youngest children differed some-
what from adults and older children. Both children and adults assumed widespread preva-
lence upon hearing a novel generic; however, the responses of older children and adults
were more extreme than those of preschoolers. Whereas preschoolers selected both the
100% sample and the 67% sample in response to generic statements (71% and 21% of
the time, respectively), adults and older children selected the 100% sample almost
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exclusively (see Table 2). This finding is consistent with prior work by Gelman et al.
(2002) examining the inductive inferences children and adults draw upon hearing novel
generics about familiar categories (e.g., “Bears like to eat ants”). Gelman et al. found that
4-year-olds display a more conservative interpretation of generics than adults, showing
less willingness to generalize from a generic statement to the category as a whole. Stud-
ies examining the role generics play in promoting essentialist reasoning regarding novel
animal (Gelman et al., 2010) and social categories (Rhodes et al., 2012) have also shown
somewhat weaker effects of generics for preschoolers than for adults. The explanation for
this age difference remains unclear. One possibility is that this effect reflects performance
factors or task demands. For example, in the current study, children may have had diffi-
culty isolating the 100% sample from the other three samples, leading to noisier attempts
to choose the 100% sample. Another possibility is that this effect reflects a legitimate
age-related change in the semantics of generics. Perhaps preschoolers have a heightened
awareness that generics admit exceptions and are thus more conservative in the inferences
they draw on the basis of generics. Such an awareness could prevent children from mak-
ing overly broad generalizations in the process of early conceptual development. If this is
the case, our findings show that children shift from this more conservative reading of
generics to the more generous reading favored by adults by 7–11 years of age; however,
it remains an open question why or how this shift might occur. Exploring these possibili-
ties is an important goal for future research.
Our data on the implied prevalence of generics also raise important broader questions
about the role of generics in knowledge construction. Much of what children know
about the world is learned through the testimony of others (e.g., Gelman, 2009; Harris &
Koenig, 2006), and given the frequency with which generics occur in conversation with
children (Gelman et al., 1998, 2008), it important to consider what children learn through
generic testimony (see also Cimpian & Markman, 2009, 2011; Gelman, 2003; Gelman
et al., 2010; Hollander et al., 2009; Rhodes et al., 2012). Our data suggest that when
children first hear a generic, they infer that the generic property applies to the vast major-
ity of category members. This assumption is appropriate in many cases. For example, by
means of generic statements, children could appropriately learn facts about the physical
characteristics, eating habits, and behaviors of animals (e.g., lions have four legs, eat
meat, roar, live in prides, etc.).
Note, however, that the observed asymmetry between the truth conditions and implica-
tions of generics complicates this matter. Some “true” generic statements express infor-
mation that applies to only a minority of category members. For a child learning through
generic testimony, however, these statements still imply widespread prevalence. For
example, upon hearing “Lions have manes” or “Lions attack people” (both plausibly true
generics that apply to fewer than half of lions), children may erroneously infer that these
properties apply to the vast majority of category members. This issue is particularly prob-
lematic when considering how children interpret generics about social categories. Given
that generics are a common vehicle for expressing stereotypes about groups of people
(e.g., Girls are bad at math) (Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004), their near-universal
prevalence implications could lead children to draw dangerous conclusions (see Rhodes
A. C. Brandone, S. A. Gelman, J. Hedglen / Cognitive Science 39 (2015) 731
et al., 2012 for a demonstration of how hearing generic language about novel social cate-
gories influences children’s category beliefs). Given the flexible truth values of generics,
these conclusions may be based on little evidence and may persist even when presented
with extensive counterevidence. However, in these cases, children may also later revise
downward their expectations about the prevalence of this property upon learning new
information (e.g., about the infrequency of lion attacks or the frequency of girls who are
good at math). Further exploring whether and how this revision process occurs and how
generic testimony influences knowledge acquisition more broadly are important issues for
future research.
4.2. Generics versus quantified statements
The current paper also contributes to the literature on children’s comprehension of the
truth conditions and implications of quantified statements. The present studies reveal that
by preschool age, children demonstrate some competence in understanding quantifiers.
Specifically, by 4–5 years, children show a nascent understanding of the semantics of
statements quantified by all and some and how they differ from generics even in the con-
text of novel categories. In the truth condition task (Study 1), preschoolers appropriately
viewed all-quantified statements as true at the 100% prevalence level and some-quantified
statements as true at levels as low as 33%. Moreover, in the implied prevalence task
(Study 2), preschoolers recognized the different prevalence implications of statements
quantified by all and some. Thus, data suggest that preschoolers have mastered some key
aspects of the semantics of quantifiers. However, consistent with previous research
showing that explicitly quantified statements are relatively difficult for young children to
master, our data also show that even 7- to 10-year-olds are not adultlike in their interpre-
tations of quantifiers. In particular, children demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to scalar
implicatures, experienced difficulty interpreting most-quantified statements, and showed a
tendency to interpret quantified statements as generics.
First consider children’s sensitivity to scalar implicatures. Scalar implicatures appear in
examples such as “Some politicians are corrupt,” where the speaker’s use of the quantifier
some typically indicates that he or she had reasons not to use a stronger quantifier (e.g.,
all, most). Thus, in a conversational context, a statement such as “Some politicians are
corrupt” yields the implicature that “Not all politicians are corrupt.” In the current
studies, adults clearly showed evidence of computing scalar implicatures—rejecting
some- and most-quantified statements when they were used to describe a sample where the
target property was present in all category members (Study 1) and assuming “not more
than some” and “not more than most” prevalence interpretations for some- and most-quanti-
fied statements, respectively (Study 2). However, consistent with prior research (e.g.,
Brooks & Sekerina, 2006; Crain et al., 1996; Gualmini, 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Hurewitz
et al., 2006; Lidz & Musolino, 2002; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003;
Papafragou & Schwarz, 2006), children were less sensitive to scalar implicatures in our
tasks. Older children showed sensitivity to the implied upper bound of some-quantified
statements but failed to do so for statements quantified by most. Moreover, preschoolers
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showed no evidence of scalar implicatures on either task. These findings confirm that
while even preschoolers recognize the basic semantics of the quantifiers some and all,
they are not as sophisticated as adults in their ability to draw pragmatic inferences (see
Crain et al., 1996; Musolino & Lidz, 2006; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous
et al., 2007 for evidence showing that whether or not children compute scalar implicat-
ures depends on a variety of factors ranging from children’s own information-processing
abilities to details of the experimental context).
Findings from the current study also highlight children’s difficulty interpreting most-
quantified statements until well into middle childhood. Neither preschoolers nor older
children showed clear understanding of the truth conditions of most statements as demon-
strated by their willingness to accept them at prevalence levels as low as 33%—the low-
est non-zero prevalence tested. Children’s evaluation of the implications of most
statements were somewhat more appropriate; however, even 7- to 11-year-olds were not
adultlike in their interpretations—selecting the 100% prevalence level the vast majority
of the time in response to most statements. There are a number of possible explanations
for why the semantics of most-quantified statements are particularly challenging for
young children. First, most is used in a broad range of contexts and each context requires
a subtly different interpretation. For instance, most can be used in a strictly comparative
way in addition to indicating greater than 50%. For example, “I ate the most jellybeans”
may indicate that the speaker took only a small fraction of the entire set, if others took
even less. Thus, in learning the semantics of most, children must engage in the non-trivial
task of sorting through its different uses and differentiating their meanings (Stickney,
2006). In addition, compared to quantifiers like some and all, most is unique in that it
requires numerical knowledge: to make a judgment about a most-quantified statement,
children must compare the cardinality of two sets (i.e., the number of crullets that have
spots vs. the number that do not) (Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Halberda, Taing, & Lidz,
2008; Papafragou & Schwarz, 2006). Accordingly, there is some evidence to suggest that
mature comprehension of most might await counting ability (Papafragou & Schwarz,
2006; but see Halberda et al., 2008).
An intriguing additional (not mutually exclusive) possibility is that when faced with
this quantifier whose meaning they do not yet fully understand, children may default to a
generic interpretation (see Leslie, 2008, 2012). In the current studies, children, in fact,
responded to most-quantified statements as though they were generic. On both the truth
condition and the implied prevalence tasks, preschoolers and older children (but not
adults) failed to differentiate generics and most-quantified statements (see Hollander
et al., 2002 for similar results with 3-year-olds and the quantifiers some and all). More-
over, children’s pattern of responses to both generic and most-quantified statements was
comparable to adults’ pattern of responses to generics: They were accepted as true at a
broad range of prevalence levels and implied near-universal prevalence. This finding is
consistent with the recent theoretical framework proposing that generics express default
generalizations about kinds, whereas quantified statements reflect generalizations that are
cognitively more sophisticated (Leslie, 2008, 2012). Support for this proposal comes from
recent studies documenting that generics are processed more rapidly (Meyer, Gelman, &
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Stilwell, 2011) and elicit fewer errors (Leslie & Gelman, 2012; Leslie, Khemlani, &
Glucksberg, 2011) than quantified statements. On this view, when faced with taxing cog-
nitive demands and a quantifier whose meaning they have not yet fully mastered, children
default to a generic interpretation. It is important to note that conclusions regarding chil-
dren’s lack of differentiation between generics and most statements are limited by the
sensitivity of our methodology. It may be that the tasks used in the current studies were
not sufficiently sensitive to detect differences in the semantics of generics and most-quan-
tified statements in children.6 Thus, more work is needed to determine when children
grasp the semantics of most and differentiate them from the semantics of generics. Never-
theless, the generics-as-default hypothesis is a promising avenue for future research.
4.3. Conclusion
Generic statements offer a commonplace way to express generalizations about catego-
ries and convey knowledge about the world. As a result, they have been argued to play a
central role in human reasoning, to provide insight into the nature of concepts, and to be
a significant contributor to children’s knowledge acquisition (e.g., Gelman, 2009; Prasada,
2000). For these reasons, it is important to understand both how children evaluate the
truth and falsity of generics and what they see as the implications of novel generics.
Results of the current studies confirm that by preschool age, children interpret generics in
much the same way that adults do. Like adults, preschoolers recognize that generics
embody flexible truth conditions as well as near-universal prevalence implications. More-
over, preschoolers share adults’ intuitions about the uniqueness of the semantics of gener-
ics as compared to quantifiers. These findings set the stage for further explorations into
what generics reveal about children’s concepts and how generics influence conceptual
development.
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Notes
1. According to many accounts, generic sentences contain an unspoken operator
“Gen” that shares many of its properties with adverbs of quantification (e.g., usu-
ally, generally, typically), making generics a part of the quantification system (e.g.,
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Asher & Morreau, 1995; Diesing, 1992; Greenberg, 2003; Heim, 1982; Kamp,
1981; Krifka et al., 1995; Lewis, 1975; Pelletier & Asher, 1997). Following Carl-
son (1977) and Leslie (2007), however, in the current paper we do not classify
generics as quantificational statements and we use the term quantifier to refer to
the standard set of explicit quantificational terms (e.g., most, all, many, some,
every). See Leslie (2007) for a complete discussion of why “Gen” should not be
considered a quantifier in any of the standard senses.
2. This analytic technique uses the binary response to an independent variable (preva-
lence level) to impute a new dependent variable (average prevalence level that led
to right responses in the truth condition task). Although unconventional, this ana-
lytic technique provides initial estimates of the effects of age and wording condi-
tion on participants’ responses in the truth condition task. More important, this
technique is necessary to convert responses in the truth condition task to a metric
that can be compared directly to the percentage estimates in the implied prevalence
task (Study 2).
3. Adults occasionally judged the 0% prevalence level as compatible with some and
most assertions. This pattern of responding is appropriate if participants are viewing
the given sample as a subset of a larger population. For example, in a sample of 6,
none of the pictured individuals may have the property, but if you assume that the
kind is composed of a larger set of individuals, some or even most of the kind
may. We did not specify whether the pictured sample was exhaustive of the kind
or a random, representative, or selective sample; thus, any of these responses are
appropriate in this task.
4. Within the older age group, there was a marginal correlation between age and
prevalence estimates for most statements, suggesting increasing sensitivity to the
scalar implicatures in statements quantified by most between 7 and 11 years of age,
r (13) = .45, p = .092.
5. Within the older age group, further analyses suggested that children may be begin-
ning to differentiate the implications of generics and most statements during middle
childhood. We performed a median split on the basis of age and conducted paired
samples t-tests comparing the implied prevalence of generics and most statements
within each half of the older age group. Results showed that, whereas the younger
half of the children did not differentiate the prevalence implications of generics
and most statements, the older half of the children showed a marginal difference,
t(6) = 2.12, p = .078.
6. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the lack of differentiation in the implied
prevalence of generics and most statements may be due, in part, to the rather coarse
grain of the prevalence levels tested in the current study. A different pattern of
results may have emerged if finer grained distinctions had been used (e.g., includ-
ing an 83% (5 of 6) prevalence level). Although this remains a possibility, the fact
that the prevalence levels used here were sufficient to detect differences in adult
participants demonstrates developmental differences in differentiating the implica-
tions of generics and most statements.
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